The materials described in Paragraphs III(A)(2)(a) - (f) above will g. be referred to as the "EC Production."

Document 6-5

The Requesting Parties agree that the possession of materials by the EC, obtained by seizure or other means, does not constitute a waiver by Dell of any privilege or other exemption against production.

- Only active, user-created, and non-deleted files will be processed and 3. reviewed for possible production. Fragmented, shadowed, deleted, and similar non-active data will not be processed, reviewed, or produced. System files, program files, executable files, empty files, templates, and other files that come with system or application files will not be processed, reviewed, or produced.
- 4. Backup tapes, shared drives, home computers, and other media will not be processed, reviewed, or produced, unless a Requesting Party can establish a reasonable likelihood (a) that responsive data exists on such media that is non-duplicative of data available from any other source and (b) that such data bears a significant impact on the claims or defenses in the litigation.

The Requesting Parties shall have 90 days after Dell's production of the First Inspection Set and the EC Production to establish that such media should be processed, reviewed, or produced. If no such showing is made, Dell shall have no further obligation to preserve backup tapes, shared drives, home computers, or other media under the Preservation Stipulation, Supplemental Preservation Stipulation, or otherwise.

The Requesting Parties shall bear all costs associated with the processing, review, and production of data from such backup tapes, shared drives, home computers, or other media.

- 5. Except to the extent the EC Production may consist of paper (or imaged static documents), Dell will not gather, review, or produce paper documents.
- 6. The parties will prepare a joint stipulation to file with the appropriate courts to reflect the agreements herein that modify or supersede the Preservation Stipulation and the Supplemental Preservation Stipulation.

В. Pre-culling

The data will be pre-culled by file type, de-duplication, and date.

1. File types

The following file types will be processed and reviewed for a. possible production: (1) doc, (2) mpp, (3) msg, (4) oft, (5) ost, (6) pdf, (7) pps, (8) ppt, (9) pst, (10) pub, (11) rtf, (12) tif, (13) txt, (14) vsd, (15) wbk, (16) wk1, (17) wks, (18) wpd, (19) xls, (20) xlw, and (21) zip.

b. Other file types will not be processed, reviewed, or produced.

2. De-duplication

- a. De-duplication for e-mail and electronic documents will be done by custodian so that only one instance of a file has to be reviewed/produced for each custodian.
- b. Near-duplicates will be culled out and not subject to review or production.

3. Dates

a. Data files before January 1, 2002 will be culled out, except as to Michael Dell, Kevin Rollins, and Kevin Kettler, whose files from January 1, 2001 forward shall be processed and reviewed for possible production.

C. Search terms, review, and production

Because Dell and the Requesting Parties have agreed to use search terms run against the Custodian Data in place of the specific document requests, definitions, and instructions in the Subpoenas, non-privileged data files that have search term "hits" shall be presumptively produced, but Dell is not required to produce files that are clearly not relevant to the litigation.

1. First Production Set

- a. The Requesting Parties have developed a mutually agreed-upon list of search terms ("First Search Term Set") (Exhibit G), which is numbered and written/defined in dtSearch Boolean syntax to be run verbatim. Dell will run the First Search Term Set against the Custodian Data. If any of the search terms result in an inordinate number of hits, the parties will work together to narrow the search terms.
- b. Dell will review all files with search term hits for relevance to the claims and defenses in this litigation. Files without search term hits will not be reviewed or produced. Non-privileged documents with hits shall be presumptively produced, but Dell may withhold documents that are clearly not relevant to the litigation. Non-privileged, responsive documents shall be produced to AMD and Intel in native format as further detailed in the Dell Stipulation Regarding Electronic Discovery and Format of Document

Production (the "Dell Native Production Stipulation") (Exhibit H), which is incorporated into this Agreement by reference. These documents shall constitute the "First Inspection Set." If a non-privileged file contains a search term hit and is going to be part of the First Inspection Set, that entire file, including attachments, shall be presumptively part of the First Inspection Set, but Dell is not required to include in the First Inspection Set attachments that are clearly not relevant to the litigation.

- c. AMD and Intel shall review the First Inspection Set on their vendors' systems consistent with the provisions of the Dell Native Production Stipulation (Exhibit H).
- d. No later than 60 days after receiving the First Inspection Set, AMD and Intel shall designate files for production. Using the reference file identifier supplied by Dell, AMD and Intel shall provide Dell a consolidated list of documents for production. The Requesting Parties will convert the designated native files to tiff format and Bates-number and brand the files as "Confidential" pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the AMD Action. The Requesting Parties will create a load file based on agreed-upon specifications to accompany the tiff images. The tiff images and load file shall constitute the First Production Set. The Requesting Parties shall jointly bear the costs of creating the First Production Set.

2. Second Production Set

- a. No later than 60 days after receiving the First Inspection Set, AMD and Intel may create another mutually agreed-upon list of search terms, which shall be numbered and written/defined in dtSearch Boolean syntax to be run verbatim ("Second Search Term Set"). Dell will run the Second Search Term Set against Custodian Data. If any of the search terms result in an inordinate number of hits, the parties will work together to narrow the search.
- b. Dell will review the non-duplicative files that contain hits from the Second Search Term Set for relevance to the claims and defenses in this litigation. Files without search term hits will not be reviewed or produced. Non-privileged documents with hits shall be presumptively produced, but Dell may withhold documents that are clearly not relevant to the litigation. Non-privileged, responsive documents shall be produced to AMD and Intel in native format as further detailed in the Dell Native Production Stipulation (Exhibit H). These documents shall constitute the "Second Inspection Set." If a non-privileged file contains a search term hit and is going to be part of the Second Inspection Set, that entire file, including attachments, shall be part of the Second

Page 22 of 30

- Inspection Set, but Dell is not required to include in the Second Inspection Set attachments that are clearly not relevant to the litigation.
- AMD and Intel shall review the Second Inspection Set on their c. vendors' systems consistent with the provisions of the Dell Native Production Stipulation (Exhibit H).
- d. No later than 60 days after receiving the Second Inspection Set, AMD and Intel shall designate files for production. Using the reference file identifier supplied by Dell, AMD and Intel shall provide Dell a consolidated list of documents for production. The Requesting Parties will convert the designated native files to tiff format and Bates-number and brand the files as "Confidential" pursuant to the Protective Order entered in the AMD Action. The Requesting Parties will create a load file based on agreed upon specifications to accompany the tiff images. The tiff images and load file shall constitute the Second Production Set. The Requesting Parties shall jointly bear the costs of creating the Second Production Set.

3. No further production

- After completing the First and Second Production Sets and the EC a. Production, Dell will have no further obligation to run additional search terms, to search for or produce other information, or to preserve any data, documents, or other information for possible production.
- No later than 30 days after Dell has notified the Requesting Parties b. that it has completed the First and Second Production Sets and the EC Production, all other Dell data and information, including the First and Second Inspection Sets, shall be returned to Dell and permanently deleted from all systems and media used to process, review, produce, store, or backup the data, except as may otherwise be agreed between the parties hereto. The Requesting Parties and their vendors shall certify deletion of this data.

D. Privilege log

The Requesting Parties may seek a privilege log as to no more than two 1. mutually-agreed, three-month periods of the relevant time for production. If the Requesting Parties cannot agree, AMD and Intel may each select one three-month period. Dell is not obligated to provide any other privilege logs. If a privilege log is requested, it must be requested no later than March 1, 2007.

IV. Transactional Data

Notwithstanding any of the provisions detailed above, Dell will preserve its copies of the microprocessor procurement databases described in the Preservation Stipulation for production of transactional data.

The Requesting Parties will prepare a consolidated list of transactional data they seek. The parties will then negotiate the scope and protocols for production of that data.

V. Cost

AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel agree to compensate Dell in the amount of \$890,000 for Dell's costs of collecting, processing, hosting, and producing data and documents under this Agreement and in response to the Subpoenas. AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel shall each pay Dell \$296,667 within 15 days of Dell's production of the First Inspection Set. If Dell produces the Phase One Inspection Set on a rolling basis, this payment shall be made within 15 days of when Dell gives AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel notice that production of the First Inspection Set is substantially complete.

As outlined above in Section III(C)(1)(d) and Section III(C)(2)(d), AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel agree to pay the costs of creating and producing the First and Second Production Sets and for Dell to obtain a copy of the First and Second Production Sets in a format agreeable to Dell.

The payments in this Paragraph V shall constitute the only and final reimbursement by AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel of costs incurred by Dell in complying with this Agreement or in responding to the Subpoenas. Dell will pay its own attorney review costs and any and all other additional costs incurred in collecting, processing, hosting, reviewing, or producing data or in otherwise complying with the terms of this Agreement or responding to the Subpoenas, with the exception of any costs incurred in the production of data pursuant to Paragraph III(A)(4) above.

VI. Production of Data to Other Requesting Parties

The Requesting Parties agree that Dell will not produce to any party other than AMD, the MDL Plaintiffs, and Intel the First and Second Inspection Sets, First and Second Production Sets, or the EC Production until the Requesting Parties have an opportunity to resolve any cost-sharing issues between or among themselves either through negotiations and agreement or through intervention of the Special Master.

VII. Alienware

The parties agree to negotiate a similar custodian-based, search-term production protocol for the subpoenas served on Alienware. Pending negotiation of that agreement, the Requesting Parties agree that Alienware may have an indefinite extension of time to object or otherwise respond to subpoenas to Alienware.

Case 1:08-cv-00853-SS

Dated: January 18 2007

By:

2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201-1515

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By:

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ATTORNEYS FOR CALIFORNIA PLAINTIFFS

MICROPROCESSOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION

EXHIBIT G TO DOCUMENT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN DELL AND REQUESTING PARTIES

FIRST SEARCH TERM SET

- 1. (meet* w/2 comp) or (meet* w/2 compet*)
- 2. mcp
- 3. mcap
- 4. ecap or "e-cap" or lcap or "l-cap" or "price exception"
- 5. moap or "mother of all programs"
- 6. iip or "intel inside"
- 7. mid w/2 comp
- 8. jumpstart
- 9. (amd or opteron) w/10 fund*
- 10. (bid or bridge) w/2 (fund* or bucket* or packet* or pot* or manag*)
- 11. except* w/2 fund
- 12. tracker
- 13. go w/2 fast*
- 14. "processor fund*" or (pric* w/3 fund*) or (Intel w/3 fund*) or (match* w/3 fund*)
- 15. D315
- 16. forward w/2 pric*
- 17. tactic*
- 18. (tell* or told or speak* or spoke* or commun* or inform* or meet* or met or confer* or call* or discuss* or share* or note or respon* or roadmap) w/5 (paul or ottelini or craig or barrett or andy or grove or art or intel)
- 19. fight* w/25 fund*
- 20. cassini

- 21. maid or bambino or robusto or "square hole"
- 22. maverick or renegade or nemo or lilo or stitch
- 23. project w/10 shanghai
- 24. amd* or (advanced w/2 (microdevices or devices))
- 25. opteron*
- 26. athlon* or A64* or duron or sempron or K-8
- 27. intel w/2 (approv* or guideline* or permi* or polic* or lever*)
- 28. amd or intel w/20 (share or position or percent*)
- 29. *processor* w/3 (strateg* or plan*)
- 30. etr or "executive technical review"
- 31. "processor landscape"
- 32. roadmap w/20 (intel or amd)
- 33. (amd or intel) w/20 (negotiat* or deal or strateg*)
- 34. intel w/10 (fud or threat* or withhold* or retaliat* or retribution* or fear* or afraid or *fair or harm* or hurt*)
- 35. intel w/10 (punish* or revenge or kill* or lever* or pressur* or compet* or obstruct* or kick* or aggress* or damag* or squeeze*)
- 36. (los* or loos* or *hold*) w/10 (fund* or mdf or rebate* or favor* or check)
- 37. "cliff discount*" or "first dollar" or "dollar one" or ber or "back end rebate" or predatory
- 38. (soft or sludge or discretion*) w/10 (money or dollars or *\$\$* or fund*)
- 39. (field* w/10 rate*) or ifr
- 40. intel w/10 ("below cost" or "below margin" or free or bundl*)
- 41. intel w/10 (incent* or rebate or discount or special or *\$\$\$* or dcp or "demand creation program")
- 42. intel w/10 ("supply line agreement" or sla)
- 43. intel w/10 (relationship* or partner*)

- intel w/10 (exclusi* or *only* or *house or *shop or quota or restrict* or "loyal*" or 44. "preferred" or promis* or "no choice")
- 45. intel w/10 (scheme* or strateg* or agreement* or loi or "letter of intent" or loi or mou or "memo of understanding" or "memorandum of understanding" or contract*
- 46. intel w/10 (jedec or ieee or tgc or adt or pci-sig)
- 47. intel and (capacity w/5 problem*)
- 48. intel w/10 (refus* or angry or unhappy* or weak* or concern* or nightmar* or terribl* or fiasco* or disaster* or catastroph* or calamity or debacle* or disappoint* or frustrat* or furious* or upset* or livid or enrage* or poor* or uncomfortable or fault* or mistak* or miscalculat* or mismanage* or bad or risk* or lose or lose or lost or *happy* or pain* or hardball or "dirty trick*")
- 49. (intel or microprocessor*) w/10 ("executive summary" or "executive report" or "board presentation" or bod or minutes or directors or management* or committee* or "white paper" or "task force" or consultan*)
- 50. (hector or ruiz or dirk or meyer or marty or seyer or dave or fionda or jerry or vogel) w/3 (clarke or koval or everett or vanderslice or kevin or rollins or zucker or stephan)
- 51. competition w/10 (*fair or attack* or harm* or hurt* or destroy* or disadvantage* or kill* or outspend* or bury or beat* or "shut out" or "keep out" or "lock out" or "squeeze out" or "at all costs")
- 52. (cloran or wright or fionda) and (deal or mobile or laptop or desktop or server or sempron* or duron* or turion* or dual-core*)
- 53. (win or won or lose or lost or risk or bid) w/5 (pixar* or amazon* or monster* or cgg or petrobas* or cybertrader or "american airlines" or aa or msn or eauction or belgacom or stockholm or "france telecom" or "bank of greece" or nec or statoil or volvo or fiat or supercomputer* or cluster*)
- (bapco or sysmark* or ecost or e?cost) w/10 (*fair or *advantage* or *competiti* or 54. complaint* or manipulate* or influence* or deceptive)
- 55. price/perf* or (price w/10 performance) and (amd or intel)
- 56. kadoka or (sweat w/10 tears)
- 57. point* w/10 indifference*
- 58. swot
- 59. iftc or "japan fair trade commission" or "european commission" or "eu" or "competition authorities"

- 60. intel w/10 (antitrust or anticompetitive or monopol* or litigation or sanction* or illegal or unfair)
- 61. (mccollam or savo or sant or lefree or kurtzer or kinoshita or hunter or harder or foote or el-dardiry or shah or timm or webb or lahr or larsen or kawamura or gleissner or fleck or fleig or aertebjerg) w/5 (*competi* or tell* or told or speak* or spoke* or commun* or inform* or meet* or met or confer* or call* or discuss* or share* or note or respon*)
- 62. ccp
- 63. mmbp
- 64. (5x5 or qbr or ebr) and (amd or intel)
- 65. otellini or grove or maloney or gelsinger
- 66. "guidance package"
- 67. (100* or pure or exclusive) and (amd or intel)
- 68. strat* buy
- 69. "tier 0 incentive"
- 70. "refuse to lose"
- 71. "orange book*" or "yellow book*" or "red book*"
- 72. "contingent upon" and (amd or intel)
- 73. "economic value" and (amd or intel)
- 74. spiff* and (amd or intel)
- 75. "bucket funds"
- 76. (free or "no charge") w/20 (amd or intel)
- 77. (D-350 or "commercial desktop") and (amd or intel)
- 78. "share the pain"
- 79. vendor w/ 10 "target income"
- 80. enhancement and (amd or intel)
- 81. allocation w/20 (amd or intel)
- 82. "hit the number*"

- 83. "sweetheart deal" and (amd or intel)
- 84. ("tier one" or "tier 1" or "tier zero" or "tier 0") and (amd or intel)
- 85. "mnc"
- 86. amd w/ 10 *suit or litigation
- 87. "Fat Tire" or Guinness or Sonic or Shiner or "Kirin Ichiban" or "Tsing Tao" or "Blair Bonnie" or Bristol or Humpback or Magnum or Bouillon or Vanguard or Octans

EXHIBIT 5

Case 1:08-cv-00853-SS

In The Matter Of:

Advanced Micro Devices v Intel Corporation

Teleconference December 1, 2008



230 North Market Street • Wilmington, DE 19801 • phone 302.571, 0510 • fax 302.571,1321 15 East North Street • Dover, DE 19901 • phone 302.734,3534 • fax 302.734,3552 Corbett & Wilcox is not affiliated with Wilcox & Fetzer, Court Reporters

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               IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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     ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES,
 3
                      Plaintiffs, )
 4
     ν.
                                     Civil Action
 5
                                     No. 05-441-JJF
     INTEL CORPORATION,
 6
                      Defendant.
 7
          Teleconference in the above matter, taken pursuant
     to notice before Debra A. Donnelly, Registered
 8
    Professional/Certified Realtime Reporter, in the offices
     of Blank Rome, LLP, 1201 North Market Street, Wilmington,
 9
    Delaware, on Monday, December 1, 2008, beginning at
     approximately 1:00 p.m., there being present:
10
11
    BEFORE:
12
          THE HONORABLE VINCENT J. POPPITI, SPECIAL MASTER
13
    APPEARANCES:
14
          O'MELVENY & MYERS
          LINDA J. SMITH, ESQUIRE
15
          CHARLES P. DIAMOND, ESQUIRE
         MARC S. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE
16
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               Los Angeles, California 90067
17
                -- and --
         RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER
18
         FREDERICK L. COTTRELL, III, ESQUIRE
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1	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Let's	
2	start the roll call with AMD, since it's AMD's	
3	application, please.	
4	MR. BALICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor.	
5	It's Adam Balick from Balick & Balick. I have on the	
6	line with me Linda Smith, Charles Diamond, and Marc	
7	Williams, all from O'Melveny & Myers.	
8	MS. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor.	
9	MR. COTTRELL: Your Honor, in Wilmington	
10	Fred Cottrell and Steve Fineman.	
11	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you all.	
12	From Dell, please.	
13	MS. MAGUIRE: Your Honor, Lauren Maguire	
14	from Ashby & Geddes, and with me I have Tom Jackson and	
15	Chris Maynard from Jones Day.	
16	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you very	
17	much.	
18	MS. MAGUIRE: Your Honor, we also	
19	represent Kevin Rollins, and Wil Barry from Richards	
20	Kibbe & Orbe is on the line as well.	
21	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you. And	
22	from the Class, please.	
23	MR. ATHEY: Your Honor, Clay Athey from	
24	Prickett Jones & Elliott for the Class.	

	5	
1	MR. FIMMEL: Steve Fimmel from Hagens	
2	Berman Sobol & Shapiro for the Class. Good afternoon,	
3	Your Honor.	
4	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Good afternoon	
5	to the both of you.	
6	And from Intel, please.	
7	MR. HORWITZ: Good afternoon, Your	
8	Honor. Here in Wilmington it's Rich Horwitz at Potter	
9	Anderson.	
10	MR. STONE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.	
11	It's Rod Stone and Bob Cooper from Gibson Dunn & Crutcher	
12	in Los Angeles.	
13	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Good afternoon	
14	to you as well.	
15	Please, let's proceed with the argument	
16	on AMD's motion.	
17	MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it's Linda	
18	Smith. Should I begin since it's our motion?	
19	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes, please.	
20	MS. SMITH: Okay. I think we disposed	
21	of the case law regarding concurrent jurisdiction, and so	
22	I'm going to just argue very quickly the effect of the	
23	contractual arrangement. This is the subject of their	
24	replacement brief.	

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And as you do that, and I understand that -- first of all, I'm going to ask Dell whether Dell agrees that we had disposed of that particular issue?

However, I do want to ask it in the context, for my own benefit, not necessarily for the benefit of any decision I need to make, but are you suggesting, Ms. Smith, that you agree that there is concurrent authority? That is, that each of the courts has the authority to enforce subpoenas that issue from the district in Texas?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I'm a little
bit -- I have not seen the use, in the cases, and I have
reviewed all the applicable case law, I hope, and I have
not seen the use of the word concurrent.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I haven't either.

MS. SMITH: And that was the term that Dell used in their replacement brief.

But, you know, I'm just following -- I
mean, there is a Fifth Circuit Court case, and I know
Your Honor is well familiar with these, but this is
In re: Clients and Former Clients of Barron & Budd, P.C.
and Occupational Medical Resources, Inc.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes.

MS. SMITH: And it's 478 F. 3d 670, and

it's 5th Circuit.

9.

11:

It starts out with the basic principle that a motion to quash or modify a subpoena is to be granted by the court in which the subpoena is issued. And then it goes down to say certain federal statutes create an exception to the rule that only the issuing court may quash, modify, or enforce the subpoena.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right.

MS. SMITH: For example, the multidistrict litigation statute authorizes a judge assigned an MDL action to "exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." Citing Section 1407(b). This statute, therefore, authorizes the transferee district court to exercise the authority of a district judge in any district. The transferee court may hear or decide motions to compel or motions to quash or modified subpoenas directed to nonparties in any district.

Though the statutory language refers to pretrial depositions, the statute wisely has been

interpreted to embrace document production subpoenas as well. And then it cites Moore's Federal Practice.

And then, Your Honor, we found another 5th Circuit case, which is called -- and, I'm sorry, this will be the last. There is plenty of case law. I don't need to cite it, but it's called Astarte, A-S-T-A-R-T-E, Shipping Co. versus Allied Steel & Export Service, 767 F. 2, 86, 87 is the jump cite, and it's 5th Circuit 1985, that cited In re: Miller, and it says, "First of all, a transfer under Section 1407 transfers the action lock, stock, and barrel. The transferee district court has the power and the obligation to modify or rescind any orders in effect in the transferred case which it concludes are incorrect."

And between that and the Pogue case,
Your Honor, and certain other cases that are at least
governing in the 5th Circuit, not to mention the other
cases that have been cited both by Your Honor in the
Fry's decision, as well as by the parties in their
original briefing, it seems to us that whether the MDL
Court under Section 1407, and the case law and the
Panel's mandate sit as if it is in the Western District
of Texas, and every other district court where a subpoena
issues in an MDL case, or if it sort of transfers to you,

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it doesn't make a difference. And probably the starkest example of this is a case that I really like, and that's the one that they cited again, Dell has cited again, and that's In re: Uranium Antitrust Litigation, and that is 503 F. Supp. 33, and that is a case where --

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes, buy me a ticket to fly.

MS. SMITH: Yeah, that is a case where the court decided that the transferee judge did have the jurisdiction, but that he had to -- he had to move and hear these things in every district court where a subpoena was pending. And that was later -- you know, that notion was later disabused, both in Pogue, where they basically said, you know, they gave U.S. ex rel. Pogue, P-O-G-U-E, versus Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, which said, basically, I'm not going to give you the whole thing, but the judge found that while he had the power to act in another district as a judge of that district, the language of Section 1407 permitting a judge to exercise the powers in any district requires the judge to journey to another district. And the judge said we do not find that Section 1407 requires the court to become a peripatetic dispenser of justice, and agree with the other courts that have rejected this reading.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: But I think you are suggesting by my question and your comments that even though you are accepting the words that Dell uses for purposes of refiling their document, you're not agreeing with Dell that it is concurrent authority. Is that correct?

MS. SMITH: That is correct. I think this court, as the MDL court, has the authority and it can operate as it so chooses.

even before you get into a discussion as to whether there is or there was an agreement as between you and Dell that subpoenas would issue from the District Court in Texas, and in addition to that the authority that the multidistrict court ultimately received, because I understand that the — that the agreement was — the order that Judge Farnan entered was earlier. But let me assume for the moment that that agreement lived beyond the order of the Panel to refer this case to Delaware.

I'd like to hear your view as to whether parties are able to agree to strip the multidistrict judge from the authority that that judge would have to enforce subpoenas or to manage issues involving the discovery in his or her case simply because there was an

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agreement to issue subpoenas from another district? I'd like to hear some conversation as to whether or not you think it is, number one, permissible, or even if it is permissible, is it wise for a certain judge to permit that to occur?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I think it is -it is that it is not permissible for the parties to
contract away the MDL court's authority.

I think if the MDL court made the decision, for whatever reason, to allow the Western District to adjudicate it for some reason, then the MDL -- that's in the MDL court's discretion, but it is not in the discretion of the parties to contract away the MDL court's authority. That's the first part of the question.

And the second is, is it wise? You know, I think we've had a lot of discussion about this already, but Section 1407 and the whole MDL process was conceived of for a very clear purpose, and in the -- you know, as we talked about, the Panel's order assigned Judge Farnan as the single judge to, quote, formulate a pretrial program that, quote, eliminates duplicative discovery, prevents inconsistent pretrial rulings, conserves the resources of the parties, their counsel,

and the judiciary, and ensures that pretrial proceedings will be coordinated in a manner leading to a just and expeditious resolution of the actions to the benefit of not just some, but all of the litigation parties.

Litigation's parties.

And I think it was the specter of having, you know, in a case this large, of having subpoenas issuing all over the United States and being differently and separately adjudicated there, was one of the reasons for the MDL pretrial consolidation. And I think the court, the reason behind the multidistrict litigation and the Panel's order is to prevent forum shopping and inconsistent results.

The other thing is -- and so I think it is wise for the MDL judge to retain that authority. And, also, I mean, frankly, this case has been now -- we're now on our three, three plus years anniversary. And this court has the expertise to evaluate this dispute, you know, based on three years of familiarity with the factual and legal issues of this MDL, and I can't imagine any other court having that kind of expertise to exercise over any kind of dispute, discovery dispute that occurs.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: But overlay your comments with the fact, and this is what Dell was

13 saying -- the efficacy of the fact is another question. 1 2 But overlay your comments with the apparent agreement -well, not apparent. There was an agreement as between 3 Dell and AMD that subpoenas would issue from other than 4 5 the MDL court. 6 Now, of course, that agreement predated 7 the MDL order. What is your view of what effect that agreement has after the entry of the MDL order? 8 9 MS. SMITH: Well, there is two things at 10 issue here. The effect of that order is nothing more 11, 12 or less than we will issue the subpoenas out of the United States District Court for the Western District of 13 14 Texas on Dell, and that is basically the full extent of the order. And it was entered into before the MDL order 15 was issued, etc. But, nonetheless -- so I think, number 16 one, it was issued at a time -- it's limited in its 17 18 context to we agree to issue the subpoenas out of. 19 It's very clear from the authority of Section 1407, the Panel's rules, as well as the case law, 20 that the adjudication of disputes arising from the 21 issuance of the subpoenas is by the MDL Panel. 22 23 So I see nothing -- by the MDL judge, 24 excuse me.

So I see nothing inconsistent, if you take our agreement a deal is a deal is a deal, that we will issue the subpoenas out of the Western District of Texas, and this court's authority to adjudicate any disputes arising therefrom.

And one other --

take, though, from the agreement as described by Intel in Intel's correspondence to me -- let me just give you a date for purposes of the record. Intel's correspondence is dated November 24 of 2008. And in that correspondence Mr. Drane advises that as between Intel and Dell, there was an agreement with respect to the issuance of the subpoenas, and there was an agreement with respect to any enforcement action on those subpoenas.

MS. SMITH: Right. Your Honor, and my view is that it's utterly and completely irrelevant to this dispute. This is an undisclosed oral agreement between Intel and Dell, and has nothing to do with this issue.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay.

MS. SMITH: First I heard of it, and

doesn't matter.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay.

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MS. SMITH: The other thing, Your Honor, and this is -- there is two more things, and I will try to be very brief.

One is that it's one thing to agree with Dell and to agree with other companies that we will issue the subpoenas out of a place where their headquarters is.

And that's all well and good.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: What was the purpose of that?

MS. SMITH: Well, I think you will have to ask Dell. They wanted it, and we saw no down side to it, so we gave it to them.

But the intent was undisclosed, and it certainly didn't encompass in our mind giving up the adjudication by the MDL, which had not yet been entered yet.

But, Your Honor, I do see something different here, and that is, you know, we looked at this long and hard in the last couple of days, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 does provide that you are supposed to issue the subpoena on a nonparty, you know, within a hundred miles of where they reside. And I think that whether or not the MDL is in effect -- of course, it is -- we are still obligated right now, with individual

deponents, as opposed to Dell the corporation, to issue subpoenas within a hundred miles of where the individuals

3 reside.

And that is why we did the five out of the Western District of Texas; we did Mr. Rollins out of Massachusetts; and consistent with that, we've done Elio Levy from Tech Data as the Middle District of Florida, and Rich Pereira of Tech Data as the Middle District of Florida; and Alex Hsu from Supermicro out of the Northern District of California, and I can go on and on.

But basically, with third parties, we are issuing them out of the district in which they reside, or within a hundred miles of the district in which they reside. And then if there is any disputes that need to be adjudicated, they're all going over to the MDL court, as is required and expected.

And the last thing, of course, and I know Your Honor is aware of this, is that the original stipulation back in June of '05 -- oh, sorry --

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I'm sorry, I missed your comment.

MS. SMITH: Okay. The original preservation stipulation, September 6, 2005, says in paragraph 11, "AMD agrees that any subpoena for testimony

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or for the production of documents and/or testimony AMD may serve upon Dell will issue out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas." On the same page of that agreement at paragraph 13 it says, "This stipulation will remain in force pending further stipulation or order of the court, or agreement of the parties to this stipulation."

And that takes us to the agreement of the parties, which is between not only AMD and Dell, but AMD and Dell and Intel and the Class. And at that time there was also another Class in the California state court, and that is the agreement that's effective as of January 1, 2007.

And as Your Honor knows, it recites that it governs all subpoenas served on Dell in a list of matters, and including the MDL, the AMD action, and the California action. Then it recites all the -- the preservation stipulation from back at September 2nd, 2005, the supplemental stipulation, the AMD service of subpoenas, Intel's service of subpoenas, the plaintiff in the MDL's action service of subpoenas, the plaintiff in the California action service of subpoenas, and concludes by saying in G, on page 2, "This agreement supersedes the subpoena, the preservation subpoena, and the supplemental

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1	preservation subpoena," and it's signed by all parties.
2	And I don't know how you know, I
3	don't know how, even if you just rely on a deal is a deal
4	is a deal, that in addition to the intervening MDL Panel
5	order and the authority that it conveyed, just as a
6	contractual basis, the original agreement was abrogated
7	by this agreement between all the parties.
8	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And Dell says
9	that it wasn't. I mean, that's their response to that.
10	Correct?
11	MS. SMITH: I think Dell says that they
12	had the undisclosed intent, as they do in the hundreds of
13	subpoenas that they receive, that they have the
14	undisclosed intent to commit to something broader than
15	what the language that we agreed to, which just says the
16	subpoenas will issue out of the Western District of Texas
17	full stop. And then it's certainly abrogated. So I
18	don't know where they get that argument. I'm sure we'll
19	hear next.
20	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Just
21	give me one moment, please.
22	Counsel, let me just again for purposes

of the record understand your position with respect to
the subpoenas that you have requested issue. And I guess

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1	my question is: You've made the decision to issue
2	subpoenas from different districts. Correct?
3	MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, based on
4	Federal Rule 45.
5	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And my question
6	is quite squarely: Do you then not agree that this
7	district, as the multidistrict court, that this district
8	has authority to issue subpoenas throughout the country?
9	MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I think this
10	district court, the MDL court has the authority to issue
11	subpoenas throughout the country.
12	That said, to be safe, and I also think
13	it is extremely clear under 1407, the Panel's rules and
14	the case law that this court has the authority to
15	adjudicate disputes over the subpoenas wherever they may
16	issue.
17	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Right.
18	MS. SMITH: I do think, in an excess of
19	caution, that it's probably prudent when you get to the
20	individual third-party deponents to issue the subpoenas
21	out of the district where they reside, because that way,
22	since we know that any dispute over them will come to
23	this court anyway, it seems to me, quote, safer. But I
24	don't think it abrogates the authority of this court, the

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1	MDL court to issue the subpoenas if it chooses.	
2	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes, and that	
3	would be that's certainly consistent with my view of	
4	this court's authority with respect to the initial	
5	authority to issue subpoenas.	
6	MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.	
7	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I don't know	
8	whether Dell has a different view, and I'm sure I'll hear	
9	that when I turn to Dell.	
10	Any other comments, then, please?	
11	MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor.	
12	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: All right. Who	
13	am I going to be hearing from for Dell? Mr. Jackson?	
14	MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor, I'm on.	
15	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you, sir.	
16	You may proceed.	
17	MR. JACKSON: All right, Your Honor.	
18	Let me begin by making a point that I	
19	think is important.	
20	The concept of where disputes get	
21	decided as it relates to Dell and Dell employees is not	
22	an issue that is unique to this litigation. Dell, in	
23	fact, as you might imagine for a company of its size,	
24	gets served with subpoenas, you know, as a nonparty from	

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1	a variety of different matters during the course of a
2	year, and it certainly adds up over time.
3	Dell's policy uniformly has been in
4	those circumstances to try and get a uniform, consistent
5	resolution of disputes that might arise, and the way they
6	have done that is by requiring that all subpoenas come
7	out of the Western District of Texas. They've done that
8	in both individual actions, and they've done it in MDL
9	actions other than the current one that is before the
10	court.
11	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me focus on
12	that for a moment, Mr. Jackson. And I'll want you I'm
13	sure you will want me to be understanding that in more
14	detail.
15	From the perspective of the
16	multidistrict court, you suggested that it's important
17	for Dell to have and I have IIm admits

- and I hope I'm adopting the word that I heard. If not, please, please correct me if I didn't. Consistency from Dell's point of view is important. Is that a fair statement?

MR. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. Across all of the various subpoenas that it gets, that is correct.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I

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understand that.

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My question is: From this district's point of view, as the multidistrict court in massive litigation as this is, isn't this the epitome of the reason for a multidistrict assignment, number one?

And if that is the case, isn't this the epitome of an example where consistency in this case, consistency across all defendants -- I'm sorry, third parties, isn't that consistency from the court's perspective much more important than consistency as it relates to Dell as an individual third party?

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I learned a long time ago never to try and speak for a court's point of view.

Let me say this, that from the perspective of nonparty discovery, that, you know, we think any issue as to whether or not it was going to be consistently decided in the MDL court or not was taken away by the stipulation which agreed as part of a whole document production process that it would occur in the Western District of Texas.

And Dell was very happy that they were able to get that agreement. They got that same agreement from Intel, and Intel understood what it meant.

So we think that whatever that issue may be from the Court's perspective, and again I don't presume to speak for the Court on its desire for consistency, that it was essentially bargained away as it relates to Dell.

And that wouldn't necessarily apply to other nonparties who either did or did not ask for a similar and get a similar agreement.

Mr. Jackson, and focusing squarely on that issue, wouldn't that present the domino effect or the possibility of a domino effect of many third parties negotiating for a position that literally strips this court of its authority as granted by the transfer order as contemplated by the federal statute? Namely, to manage discovery, to eliminate duplicate discovery, to prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, right down the line.

MR. JACKSON: But, Your Honor, I also don't want to engage in a question of trying to predict what may or may not happen or what has happened with respect to other nonparties. I simply don't know the answer to that question.

What I do know is that the process and

24 its efforts of consolidating together discovery doesn't 1 strip the parties to the MDL, both the plaintiff and the 2 defendant, from being able to engage in negotiations for 3 4 the production of documents and other things. 5 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I understand that completely. 6 7 MR. JACKSON: And in the process of doing that, you know, if they choose to give up the 8 9 resolution of that dispute to another place, I don't see any reason why an MDL court wouldn't honor that 10 obligation, just like any other court would in a normal 11 12 piece of litigation. 13 And so --14 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Would you not 15 agree with me? 16 MR. JACKSON: I'm sorry? 17 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Would you not agree with me that when you submit -- at least it's been 18 19 my experience on the receiving end of receiving stipulations from the parties dealing with pretrial 20 issues, it is the practice, at least of this Special 21 Master, on behalf of this particular judge, to review the 22

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stipulation is not consistent with my responsibility of

stipulations, and if I make a determination that the

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1	coordinating and conducting and supervising discovery, I
2	won't sign a stipulation just because it's submitted. I
3	won't put a so ordered just because there is a so ordered
4	on the bottom of it.
5	Isn't it my responsibility as a special
6	master to review that stipulation and make sure that it
7	makes sense in the entire operation of the multidistrict
8	litigation?
9	MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, again, I'll
10	confess I've never been in your position, and so I
11	haven't thought about it as far as I'm concerned.
12	What I do know is that there is nothing
13	about the MDL process that ought to take away the parties
14	to that proceeding's ability to come to accommodations or
15	resolutions to try and cut down the number of issues that
16	find their way to you or to the district judge or anybody
17	else.
18	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: It would seem
19	to me that that's working the process for the purposes of
20	making it more efficient.
21	My question goes to parties agreeing in
22	the context of multidistrict litigation that you are

you are taking the authority away from the multidistrict

court to benefit the third party, for whatever reason.

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MR. JACKSON: Understood, Your Honor.

And I think that the parties in the process are trying to get a vast amount, in this case in trying to get vast amounts of information from Dell, which they have gotten --

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes.

MR. JACKSON: -- were encouraged to sort of come to some agreements and resolutions and to cooperate with Dell in order to make that happen.

And that one of the consequences of that is if they voluntarily decide that should there be future disputes that arise -- and, you know, and we got through the document production process without ever having to have a dispute.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: You sure did.

MR. JACKSON: Knock on wood. You know, but if in exchange for that they voluntarily want to have, or were willing to give up the question of who is going to decide this issue, then I think that's perfectly consistent with all the other federal rules that exist out there.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Then let's go back to --

MR. JACKSON: I'm not trying to --

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1	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Go back to the
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4	MR. JACKSON: All right.
5	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: The question I
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8	Do you agree or disagree that the
9	multidistrict court has the authority to issue subpoenas
10	nationwide?
11	MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, I think if you
12	have jurisdiction, the natural correlation of that
.13	jurisdiction is you have that power. I just think those
14	go one from the other.
15	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And I don't
16	disagree with that. That makes sense to me.
17	My next question is, then, aside from
18	the language in the stipulated order, whereby you and AMD
19	did agree that the subpoenas would issue from the United
20	States District Court for the Western District of Texas,
21	you hear Ms. Smith saying that's the extent of the
22	agreement, and I'm hearing you say, no, it's not.
23	How do I come out on that? I mean, how
24	do you expect me to come out on that when the language of

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the document only refers to the issuance of the subpoenas in the first place?

MR. JACKSON: Well, as my client responded, Judge, when we read the AMD argument, why in the world else would they have thought we insisted on that provision to start with? And there is no other explanation for it.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Other than the question --

MR. JACKSON: Dell's reason for insisting on having it come out of the Western District is because it meets Dell's purpose of trying to have a consistent resolution of Dell's discovery obligations in the multiple lawsuits that it addresses and handles on an annual basis.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: But I'm looking at rather, you would agree with me, clear and unambiguous language in this stipulated order. I'm looking at the four corners of the document, and there is nothing that deals with the issue of enforcement. Is that a fair comment?

MR. JACKSON: I think -- I think there is -- the words enforcement appear no place in the stipulation, Your Honor. I agree with that.

I think as a natural consequence of the agreement, I think Intel understood the natural consequence of the agreement, and that's what's reflected in their letter to you.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Well, Intel comes at it from a little bit of a different perspective, because Intel names names, if you will. They said there was a conversation as between -- let me go back to that letter again for purposes of the record. Mr. Stone of Intel was having conversation with Mr. Joyce of Dell. And Mr. Joyce said that he was not going to accept -- I guess that's the word that was used, was it not? He was not going to accept service of the subpoena on behalf of Dell on the condition -- only on the condition it be issued out of the district that -- District of Texas. That's a little bit of a different record, is it not? MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, in the context of "he said, she said" sorts of comments, I will tell the Court that I have spoken to the gentleman here, Mr. Conrad, who was handling the negotiations with Mr. Pearl of O'Melveny, and Mr. Conrad tells me in no

uncertain terms Mr. Pearl understood exactly why Dell was

Also, in the context of what the Court

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insisting on this provision.

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30 1 has said, which is, you know, you're looking at the 2 agreement and the four corners, trying to avoid getting out and away from that, that the purpose of including it 3 was clear, is because that way, that the issuing court 4 5 would then decide the issue. 6 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it's Linda 7 Smith. 8 Can I say one thing here? One of the 9 things we had expected to see, because of the undisclosed 10 intent and the clear language of the agreement, not to mention that it was superseded, was a declaration, a 11 12 letter, an Affidavit, an e-mail --13 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: We'll get to --14 MS. SMITH: Anything. And, also, Mr. Pearl of our office is my partner, and he did not 15 16 deal with Mr. Conrad on this, he dealt with Jeffrey 17 Joyce. And he tells me in no uncertain terms that 18 adjudication of disputes was never discussed. 19 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I can't --20 MS. SMITH: I understand that, Your 21 Honor. 22 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: That's part of 23 the reason why there is a different record here with 24 Dell.

31 1 MS. SMITH: I agree, Your Honor. 2 what I'm saying is I would have expected --3 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Counsel, I'm going to ask you to hold your comments until you have 4 5 another chance, please. 6 MS. SMITH: Okay. Thank you. 7 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Let me then 8 focus for the moment and accept the proposition that the order, which does not contain the language of 9 enforcement, let me assume for the moment that it did. 10 11 And then I'm directed to the stipulation 12 that was entered into in January of 2007. I don't know 13 any other way to read the document production agreement between Dell and requesting parties in any other fashion 14 than to read it that all agreements entered into before 15 16 that date are obviated by the agreement of that date. 17 How can I read that any differently, 18 Mr. Jackson? 19 MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, if you look at 20 the obligations that were imposed in the original 21 stipulation and the supplemental stipulation, those obligations survived, or at least the parties have 22 behaved as if they did, because they are obligations to 23 24 maintain and preserve various items that were not

superseded by the document production agreement.

What was superseded was the requirement -- two things, really.

One, the requirement to continue an ongoing maintenance of documents on the theory that the time and path for such a requirement to make any sense.

Secondly, because we at that point had received, as Ms. Smith pointed out, multiple subpoenas that all asked for different types of documents in different forms and factions, and had different date ranges and all the variations one can imagine when you get multiple subpoenas in a same topic area, they were all superseded and replaced by a single set of search terms in a process that was agreed upon to handle that.

But the obligation as it related to future subpoenss was not part of that part of the negotiation. So I think what — if the Court looks at the other obligations that were in those stipulations, you'll see that they weren't superseded.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Well, the problem I'm having with that is the language itself.

Again, I'm confronted with language in an order which is clear and unambiguous and within the four corners of an order. It's certainly more than a contract at the point

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1	in time when Judge Farnan signed it.
2	But I'm looking at the stipulation, and
3	looking at paragraph II-G. It says, This agreement
4	supersedes the subpoenas. I understand that.
5	The preservation stipulation and the
6	supplemental preservation stipulation. Now, there is no
7	date for the preservation stipulation and no date for the
8	supplemental preservation stipulation. And yet I'm
9	hearing that the only possible reference for the
10	preservation stipulation is the stipulation re
11	preservation of documents by Dell, Inc., so ordered by
12	the court on whatever date Judge Farnan signed it. It
13	was September the 8th.
14	MR. JACKSON: In the document production
15	agreement that was entered on the 18th of January, 2007,
16	all of those various orders are attached as exhibits.
17	And the Court is correct, you are referring to the
18	right the right stipulations.
19	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I don't know
20	how I can read
21	MR. JACKSON: as a practical matter,
22	was the ongoing preservation obligation that was also in
23	that stipulation. So
24	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: But, counsel,

what it didn't do, it didn't literally carve out what you're suggesting. It didn't simply carve out the preservation stip -- the part of the order that dealt with the obligation to preserve.

It says, This agreement supersedes the preservation stipulation. I mean, how do I read that any other way than reading it the way it reads?

MR. JACKSON: The only thing I can suggest, Your Honor, is that you look at the other things that Dell was obligated only under those prior stipulations to preserve.

The argument that AMD is advancing would leave you in a situation in which the replacement agreement would have relieved us of an obligation to preserve any of the documents that we have agreed to preserve for purposes of a search, which would have left us with a very hollow result.

So, as a matter of simply reading the agreements together, it can't possibly mean that all of those obligations were gone. And the stipulation as it relates to future subpoenas and the issuance of those, because at that point the document subpoenas had already been issued out of the Western District of Texas, would have had no reason to have been superseded as it relates

1 to that.

And again, Your Honor, were I to know now, or were I to know then what the dispute would be now, of course we would have insisted upon better language to describe it. You are reading the language correctly, Your Honor.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And that is, of course, one of the reasons for the parallel evidence rule, because in hindsight we would all perhaps make language tighter in documents of this nature when we're looking back in hindsight and when there is, in fact, a dispute.

Just give me one moment to collect my thoughts. Hold on.

(Brief recess.)

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Counsel, if you have any more thoughts, please. Otherwise, I would like to hear from the Class, if there is anything to add to Ms. Smith's argument. I should have asked you that in the first place. I do apologize.

MR. FIMMEL: Your Honor, the only point that the Class wanted to make was that we were not a party to the purported agreement to have the disputes adjudicated in the Western District of Texas.

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SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Thank you.

Counsel, by virtue of even hearing that statement, and I guess I should have expected that were the case in light of the papers that have been put before me, but perhaps that's even the best example of, the Class plaintiffs from their perspective just said to me, I think, we shouldn't be stuck with this because we're in multidistrict litigation here, and we anticipated that it means what it means, and we expected ultimately Judge Farnan would have a say when there is a dispute with respect to a subpoena that gets issued.

Intel, please.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, Rod Stone on behalf of Intel.

We really were not a party to the agreement between Dell and AMD, and were not part of those negotiations, so don't really have anything to add beyond what we put in our letter with respect to the conversation I had with Mr. Joyce with respect to the issuance of the Intel subpoena.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And that, of course, is, as I understand it, simply the subject of an oral agreement as between Intel counsel and Dell counsel.

Is that correct? There is nothing in writing?

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37 1 MR. STONE: That is correct, Your Honor. 2 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. All 3 right. 4 Here is my view of this, and here is the 5 way I think it is important to create the record. I'm going to ask AMD and the Class to discuss an appropriate 6 7 form of order. I'm going to ask that Dell have the opportunity to review it and to agree to it as to form 8 9 only, expecting that they may not agree to the substance 10 of it. 11 Number one, it seems to me if I am asked, as I am being asked, to look at the stipulation 12 13 and order that was entered by the Court on September the 8th of 2005, the language of the order is what it is. It 14 15 is no more and no less than AMD and Dell agreeing that 16 subpoenas will issue for Dell out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 17 18 I'm mindful of the fact that that order 19 was entered prior to the order of the MDL Panel. also mindful of the fact that Judge Farnan would have had 20 an opportunity consistent with the law surrounding 21 22 referral of a case to an MDL judge to make a 23 determination as to whether that order should have been

modified, and he did not do that.

Just for purposes of rounding out the record, let me just direct counsel's attention to -- just hold for a second, please.

In terms of Judge Farnan having the opportunity to look at and modify any existing orders once he received the MDL assignment, if you will look at In re: Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 320 F. Supp. 1404, and that's the JPML 1971, the language of the order, as I said, is what it is. And it's important for me, absent a record that would permit me to make a determination that there was an agreement above and beyond the language of this order, to say that the language of the order is what it is, and it does not address the issue of enforcement.

So I do conclude on the basis of this record that there was no agreement that took this language and extended it. Said another way, no agreement that it's different from the language of the order itself.

Second, it seems to me that the whole purpose of the MDL federal legislation would be easily frustrated if third parties were able in conjunction with their proper effort to do what I think all parties do, and that is attempt to meet, confer, and resolve issues

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Teleconference

regarding discovery, particularly in a case of this nature where the cooperation on the part of AMD and Dell would likely — the cooperation itself produce the kind of information that has been shared, I think it would be foolish of me not to expect that if Dell chose to contest some of the requests that were being made, if other third parties chose to contest some of the requests that were being made, this litigation could come to a grinding halt.

I know that you're all aware of the path that Fry's Electronics took, and how long it took to get that matter resolved when Class plaintiffs tested those issues. But it seems to me that the whole purpose of the MDL statute and order would be frustrated were agreements of this nature to be routine.

Said another way, even if there were an agreement, and even if the -- this order was not superseded by the later agreement in January of 2007, and I conclude that it, in fact, was, even if it weren't, I would recommend to Judge Farnan that the order of September 8 of 2005 be modified in such fashion that would permit him to exercise the authority that he does have throughout the country in dealing with issues involving subpoenas, whether they issue from this court

or whether they issue from any other court.

What I would like AMD to do is to craft a form of order which puts in place my recommendation to the court. I would like to hear how quickly that can be done, because, as AMD knows, if Dell does not agree with my recommendation, they have the right to go to Judge Farnan and convince him that this is not the appropriate way or not the correct way to approach this dispute.

How quickly can AMD and the Class work on the order, and how quickly can it be turned over to Dell, and how quickly can I have it back for purposes of my signing it?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it's Linda Smith.

We can work with the Class and get this done and over to Dell by close of business today.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And turned around from Dell, please?

MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, if we get it by the end of the day, we'll have it back to you by no later -- well, assuming it follows exactly what the Court said, I'm sure we won't have problems in terms of the form, we'll get it back to you first thing in the morning.

Teleconference

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. And that would be good. I'll look for it, then, not later than noon tomorrow.

What I'm also going to propose is, knowing how quickly you all brought this to my attention and knowing that the papers do not represent a significant universe of material, as I have in other matters, I'm going to propose to the Court a quicker turnaround for you to take; that is, if Dell chooses to take exception to the order. And my inclination is to suggest that that be not later than three days from the issuance of the order.

And what I'll ask AMD to do is if you will -- no, actually, I'll generate that from this end.

What I intend to do is propose a form of order to Judge Farnan where he, number one, shortens the amount of time within which Dell can take an exception. And your submittals are, short as they are, I will likely suggest to Judge Farnan that he also impose a page limitation, if, in fact, there are exceptions taken.

What, clearly, I'm not in a position to do, in light of the expected schedule for discovery, if Dell chooses to take exception, I'm certainly not in a position to suggest how quickly this gets turned around

42 back to me for purposes of making a determination on the 1 2 underlying dispute. In the context of the order that I 3 4 prepare for Judge Farnan's signature, by virtue of 5 language that I will choose to use in that order, I will 6 suggest to him the urgency from AMD's perspective. 7 Any questions or comments, please? 8 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it's Linda 9 Smith. 10 I have just two questions, both of which 11 are not -- I think you -- both of which are not easy. 12 The first is that our response in Texas 13 to Dell's motion to quash is due on December 4, which under even this expedited program would pass before this 14 15 was completely resolved by Judge Farnan. And my question 16 to Dell is: Will you agree not to proceed in Texas until 17 such time as Judge Farnan issues his order? 18 MR. JACKSON: I am more than happy to ask the clients their view on that request. I am not --19 I do not have the authority to respond one way or the 20 21 other as we sit here on the phone. 22 MS. SMITH: All right. Judge Poppiti, 23 would -- this seems -- this seems to sort of again --24 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Ms. Smith,

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you're cutting out.

MS. SMITH: I'm sorry. This seems to exemplify the problems with not having things multidistricted.

You have made a recommendation, which may or may not be appealed to Judge Farnan. And meanwhile, can you or can Judge Farnan, if Dell will not agree to halt the Texas proceeding, ask that it be stayed until such time as -- I'm not asking you to speak for Judge Farnan. I just -- this is exactly what happens when the multidistrict court is trying to interface with another court at the same time.

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: I understand what you're saying.

In your papers to me, I believe that there was some request or suggestion that Judge Farnan engage the judge in the Western District of Texas. And I think I told you, it may not have been the last time that we talked, it may have been the first time, that I had already advised Judge Farnan's case manager that there was that request that was made. And I think I remember, without looking down at the transcript, remember telling all of you that by virtue of making that contact with Judge Farnan's Chamber, I'm sure that he is aware of it.

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1	And yet, at the same time, I'm certainly not in a	
2	position to expect when, if at all, he will accept that	
3	suggestion.	
4	MS. SMITH: Understood, Your Honor.	
5	When will I'm not sure	
6	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: The only	
7	other I landed on three days only because I landed on	
8	three days. It seems to me it's doable in two, because	
9	all of your papers are finished. It's just a matter of	
10	reformatting them to some extent, perhaps taking into	
11	consideration what I have recommended, and simply	
12	repackaging it for Judge Farnan's view if Dell chooses to	
13	do that.	
14	So if there is an expectation, and I'm	
15	certainly wanting to be fair to all concerned parties, if	
16	there is an expectation it can be done in two days, then	
17	I will recommend that we shorten the time to two days.	
18	And my experience, counsel, with respect	
19	to suggestions to Judge Farnan of that nature is that he	
20	has he has always accepted the recommendation to	
21	shorten the time and has always taken the time that I	
22	have recommended for purposes of establishing a deadline.	
23	MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, this is Tom	

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Jackson.

45 1 Taking our normal 20 days to three is fairly dramatic. Taking it yet another day or two seems 2 3 very, very short for us. 4 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Okay. Then 5 I'll leave it at three. 6 Do you have another comment or question? 7 MS. SMITH: Yes, I did. But, Mr. Jackson, will you be able to indicate to us today 8 9 whether your client is so inclined to allow us to stay 10 this until we hear from Judge Farnan? MR. JACKSON: I promise to raise the 11 12 issue with them. I do not know how quickly they will come to a decision, but as soon as they do, I will let 13 14 you know. That's all I can do. 15 SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Any other 16 comments or questions, or would you prefer -- I can 17 certainly leave you all on the line, just put you on hold, and when you're finished, if it's a matter of 18 19 further conferring --20 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, this is Linda Smith. 21 22 I have one last issue. The subpoena issued in the Western District of Texas, the first one 23 24 for the deposition of Dan Allen, provides that his

deposition is scheduled to commence on September 8th. I mean, excuse me, I've lost my track of time,

December 8th. And that would be -- that would be pretty quickly, especially considering that we need at this point to wait for Judge Farnan's ruling and then brief and address the duration of the deposition issue.

I had already written on November 24th to Mr. Jackson and his other folks at Jones Day suggesting that under the original schedule, which contemplated a more expedited -- well, was expediting things, but contemplated that the original times for briefing the second part, the duration of the deposition issue, would be originally, I'm saying, simultaneous briefs on the 4th of December and hearing on the 8th. And I, therefore, expressed to Mr. Jackson, et al. that because there may be a hearing on the 8th, that we would be happy to either issue a new subpoena for the 10th, or maybe he would agree to treat the subpoena for Dan Allen, which requires an appearance on December 8th, as if it requires his appearance on December 10th.

Mr. Jackson's response was, no, we have not -- I'm reading it. We have not agreed to any dates in any of your subpoenas. We have consistently maintained that position and continue to do so.

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Teleconference

47 So I guess what I'm saying is, we have and have always been willing to be flexible about the issue. We do need to get these depositions done, but we do understand that these have to be resolved. There is currently an outstanding subpoena directing -- Federal subpoena directing Mr. Allen to appear on the 8th at 9 o'clock, and we need to have some sort of agreement on that. And if we can't do it between the parties, I think we have to bring that issue now to Your Honor. MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, Tom Jackson, if I might. SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: Yes, please. MR. JACKSON: The issue of the subpoenas is the subject of a pending motion to quash. And as the Court knows, all of that is wound up into the issue of the question of length. And that's the sole basis on which there is a motion to quash. I am not going to recommend to my client

I am not going to recommend to my client that we require Ms. Smith to re-serve subpoenas for whatever date we ultimately agree to to take these depos on. I think one subpoena is good enough, and we can agree to change the date to whatever date it ultimately

turns out to be. Because I realize and understand that each of these people, in fact, will be deposed. The open question is for how long.

And so, you know, I'm not going to require to keep serving subpoenas or otherwise deal with that, if that helps her in any way.

MS. SMITH: Well --

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: It sounds like it helps some, doesn't it, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Well, it does help some.

You know, as Your Honor is aware, for at least these six deponents, the five current and the one former, there is an agreement that they will appear, and the question is how long.

I feel like -- and, you know, I feel like if we don't have consent that the motion to quash will be stayed, and if we don't have consent on any date, and sort of a, what I would regard as, with all due respect, somewhat of an intransigence on this issue, you know, we're in position to move for contempt on the 8th if he doesn't --

SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: My reaction is you have to do what you have to do. And if the conversation is going to be, as Mr. Jackson just

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1	suggested, the same. I mean, once this matter leaves my
2	desk, it seems to me that the issue will be squarely
3	before all of you, and it will be Dell's decision as to
4	whether or not they take exception. And if they do, I
5	think I've done my part in trying to move this along by
6	suggesting that there also be an order accompanying this
7	order asking Judge Farnan to turn to it as quickly as he
8	chooses. I don't think there is really anything more
9	that I can do from my desk other than tee it up for Judge
10	Farnan in the next four days.
11	MS. SMITH: Okay. Thank you, Your
12	Honor.
13	SPECIAL MASTER POPPITI: And leave it to
14	whomever to get his intention as quickly as possible.
15	All right. I will look for an order not
16	later than noon tomorrow, and I can assure you it will be
17	out of here soon thereafter.
18	(Hearing concluded at 2:11 p.m.)
19	
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50 CERTIFICATE 1 2 STATE OF DELAWARE 3 NEW CASTLE COUNTY 4 I, Debra A. Donnelly, a Notary Public within and for 5 the County and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that 6 the foregoing teleconference was taken before me, 7 pursuant to notice, at the time and place indicated; that 8 the teleconference was correctly recorded in machine 9 shorthand by me and thereafter transcribed under my 10 supervision with computer-aided transcription; that the transcript is a true record of the teleconference; and 11 that I am neither of counsel nor kin to any party in said 12 13 action, nor interested in the outcome thereof. WITNESS my hand and official seal this 14 day of December A.D., 2008. 15 16 17 DEBRA A. DONNELLY, RPR 18 CERTIFICATE #151-PS 19 EXPIRATION: PERMANENT 20 21 22 23 24

EXHIBIT 6



"Adam Balick" <abalick@balick.com>

Case 1:08-cv-00853-SS

12/02/2008 02:48 PM

To "Poppiti, Vincent J." <Poppiti@BlankRome.com>

Filed 12/03/2008

cc "Sloan, Elizabeth" <Sloan@BlankRome.com>, "LeVan, Mary" <LEVAN@Blankrome.com>, "David, Carrie" <david-c@BlankRome.com>,

bcc

Subject RE; AMD v. Intel; C.A. No. 05-441; 05-485; and MDL No. 05-1717

History:

马 This message has been forwarded.

Dear Judge Poppiti:

We wanted to advise you of the following developments in the Western District of Texas with respect to Dell's Motion to Quash, or Alternatively, for a Protective Order.

Judge Sparks of the Western District of Texas has ordered a hearing for this Friday, December 5, 2008, on the Motion to Quash. (See attached Order.) Based on a conversation between Judge Sparks' clerk and AMD's counsel in Texas, we understand that Judge Sparks was unaware of the MDL proceeding at the time that he scheduled the hearing. On behalf of AMD, we asked counsel for Dell to file a joint motion to stay the hearing in the Western District of Texas pending Judge Farnan's ruling on Your Honor's Report and Recommendation on the MDL Court's jurisdiction to resolve the merits of this dispute. The Dell Witnesses have refused to agree to a stay. Accordingly, AMD intends to file a motion to stay in the Western District of Texas tomorrow, which hopefully will be heard at the December 5, 2008 hearing. Because Dell's motion assumes that the Western District of Texas has jurisdiction of this dispute and addresses the merits of that dispute regarding whether these depositions should proceed at all and, if so, their duration, AMD will be forced to address the merits issues in its briefing. Judge Sparks may well decide inconsistently with the MDL Court on jurisdiction and does not have the MDL Court's three years of expertise in the law and the facts of this case to make an appropriate determination of the importance of the testimony of the Dell Witnesses.

We should also note that Dell's refusal to stay the Texas proceedings is contrary to what Dell's counsel stated to Your Honor on November 25, 2008: "I can assure you there will be no hearing in Texas prior to [December 8, 2008]." (See attached at 15:17-20.) Dell's counsel also stated at that time that it would "alert" this Court if a hearing on the Motion to Quash was set in Texas. (Id. at 15:12-13.)

Respectfully,

Adam Balick

Adam Balick

711 King St. | Wilmington DE 19801 Main Tel. (302) 658-4265 | Main Fax. (302) 658-1682





Email: abalick@balick.com | Web: www.balick.com Order.pdf AMD trenscript from 112508 teleconference.pdf

EXHIBIT 7



Thomas R. Jackson/JonesDay Extension 5-2978 12/02/2008 05:04 PM

- To Beth.Ozmun@amd.com, LSmith@OMM.com
- cc Mary_Pape@Dell.com, <Marc_Vockell@Dell.com>, csmaynard@JonesDay.com

bcc

Subject Outline of Proposed Agreement Re: Dell Depositions

Linda and Beth,

In advance of our 5:30 call, I wanted to share our thoughts on resolving our discovery disputes in the Delaware and W.D. TX courts without further need for judicial intervention. I believe we have reached a tentative agreement concerning how the depositions of the current and former Dell employees will proceed under the deposition subpoenas issued out of the Western District of Texas. To our understanding, the tentative agreement is as follows:

- 1. AMD agrees that the dates noticed in the deposition subpoenas issued out of the Western District of Texas and served upon the six former and current Dell employees are not binding and that Dell and AMD will negotiate new depositions dates for each.
- 2. Dell will schedule two deposition days with each of Jerele Neeld, Dan Allen, and Alan Luecke as soon as practical, but for dates no later than January 31, 2009, for questioning by all of the parties to this MDL proceeding. AMD does not agree that two days is the maximum deposition time Neeld, Allen, and Luecke will be made available for and Dell does not agree that any of them will be made available for additional time. AMD does agree to work in good faith to get each of these depositions completed in two days.
- 3. After the Neeld, Allen, and Luecke depositions are taken, Dell and AMD will negotiate in good faith the time limits for the depositions of Jeff Clarke, Kevin Rollins, and Michael S. Dell. In the meantime, Dell will hold open a single day in February or March for each of their depositions, though AMD understands that, at this time, Michael S. Dell is being offered for only half of a single day.
- 4. Dell will withdraw, without prejudice, its Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas or, Alternatively, for a Protective Order currently set for hearing on December 5, 2008 in the Western District of Texas before Judge Sam Sparks.
- 5. AMD and Dell will jointly withdraw, without prejudice, the application in the Delaware MDL proceeding to have Special Master Poppiti resolve the dispute as to the length of the Dell employee depositions. Further, AMD and Dell will jointly seek to have Special Master Poppiti withdraw the Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Threshold Jurisdictional Issue Raised by Current and Former Employees of Nonparty Dell Inc.

I look forward to speaking to you both in a few minutes.

Thomas R. Jackson Jones Day 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201 214-969-2978

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EXHIBIT 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

IN RE INTEL CORPORATION MICROPROCESSOR ANTITRUST LITIGATION))) MDL No. 05-1717-JJF))
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, and AMD INTERNATIONAL SALES & SERVICES, LTD., a Delaware corporation,))))
Plaintiffs,))) C.A. No. 05-441-JJF
v.) C.A. No. 05-441-JJF
INTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and INTEL KABUSHIKI KAISHA, a Japanese corporation,)))
Defendants.)
PHIL PAUL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,	
Plaintiffs,) CONSOLIDATED ACTION
v .))) DM 20
INTEL CORPORATION,)
Defendants.)

SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THRESHOLD JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE RAISED BY **CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF NON-PARTY DELL INC.**

BACKGROUND1

This Report and Recommendation involves a dispute that arose after plaintiffs Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. and AMD International Sales & Service, Ltd. (hereafter jointly, "AMD") caused subpoenas to issue out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas for the depositions of five current Dell Inc. ("Dell") employees (Dan Allen, Jeffrey W. Clarke, Michael S. Dell, Alan Luecke and Jerele D. Neeld) and out of the District of Massachusetts for the deposition of a former Dell employee (Kevin Rollins). Class Plaintiffs caused subpoenas to be issued out of the Western District of Texas for the depositions of the current Dell employees and out of the District of Massachusetts for the deposition of Kevin Rollins, a former Dell employee (collectively, "the Dell Witnesses"). Pursuant to Amended Case Management Order No. 6, AMD, Intel Corporation ("Intel") and Class Plaintiffs thereafter provided time estimates for each deposition. Counsel for the Dell Witnesses objected and declined to make the Dell Witnesses available unless the parties agreed to abbreviate the depositions.

At AMD's request, on November 17, 2008, the Special Master convened a hearing. During that hearing, counsel for the Dell Witnesses challenged the Special Master's jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas and indicated their intention to file appropriate motions in the Western District of Texas. The Special Master then ordered the parties to brief the jurisdictional issue, indicating that, if appropriate, he would address the merits of the dispute over the duration of the depositions after deciding the jurisdictional issue.

The Dell Witnesses, AMD and Intel have filed letter briefs on the jurisdictional issue. Class Plaintiffs have joined in AMD's letter brief. The Special Master held hearings on the

In entering this Report and Recommendation, the Special Master considered a proposed form of Report and Recommendation submitted on December 2, 2008 by counsel for AMD. The Special Master is advised that counsel for the Dell witnesses approved the December 2, 2008 submittal as to form only.

jurisdictional issue on November 25, 2008 and December 1, 2008. Counsel for all interested parties were present.

Counsel for the current Dell Witnesses argue that this MDL Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas for only one reason. They argue that AMD waived the MDL Court's jurisdiction when it entered into a Preservation Stipulation with Dell, which was then entered as an Order by this MDL Court on September 8, 2005 (the "2005 Order"). (no D.I. number assigned). Specifically, the Dell Witnesses point to paragraph 11 of the 2005 Order:

AMD agrees that any subpoena for testimony or for the production of documents and/or testimony AMD may serve upon Dell will issue out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

DISCUSSION

Having read and considered all of the briefs filed in this proceeding on whether AMD waived this Court's ability to resolve disputes over the Dell Witness subpoenas in favor of the Western District of Texas, and having heard argument from counsel at the hearings on November 25, 2008, and December 1, 2008, the Special Master concludes as follows:

1. Under 28 *U.S.C.* § 1407, this Court, as an MDL Court, "may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 28 *U.S.C.* § 1407(b). The 2005 Order, paragraph 11, states only that AMD will serve subpoenas on Dell that "issue" out of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The 2005 Order says nothing about enforcing or resolving disputes about such subpoenas. In the absence of any record of an agreement beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the 2005 Order, the Special Master concludes that there was no agreement between AMD and Dell that would strip this MDL Court of its authority, under 28 *U.S.C.* § 1407(b), to enforce or otherwise resolve disputes over the subpoenas served on the Dell Witnesses.

- 2. Even if the 2005 Order had included a provision stripping this MDL Court of its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b), the Special Master concludes that the 2005 Order was expressly superseded by the January 1, 2007 Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation Document Production Agreement Between Dell and Requesting Parties. Hence, any preexisting agreement between AMD and Dell concerning enforcement of subpoenas would have been abrogated.
- this MDL Court of the power to enforce subpoena issues in this coordinated action, the Special Master concludes that it would frustrate the very purposes of the MDL legislation eliminating duplicative discovery, preventing inconsistent pretrial rulings, conserving the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary, and ensuring that pretrial proceedings will be conducted in a manner leading to a just and expeditious resolution of the actions to the benefit of not just some but all of the litigation's parties. Moreover, although, Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 encourages agreed-upon, lawyer managed discovery to limit the cost, effort and expense involved in court intervention in discovery matter practice, *Lee v. Central Gulf Towing, L.L.C.*, 2004 WL 2988478, at *2 (E.D.La. Dec. 09, 2004), parties and non-parties alike should not by agreement be permitted to strip an MDL Court of its authority under 28 *U.S.C.* § 1407 without the express order of the MDL Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Special Master concludes that this District Court has the authority to enforce the subject subpoenas.

IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:

(a) In exercise of the Court's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to "modify or rescind any orders in effect in the transferred case which it concludes are incorrect," Astarte Shipping Co.

² In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation, 403 F.Supp.2d 1356 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 3, 2005) (transfer order).
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v. Allied Steel & Export Service, 767 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 320 F. Supp. 1404 (J.P.M.L. 1971), the 2005 Order BE RESCINDED;

(b) The Court exercise its authority, sitting both as an MDL Court and for purposes of this case as a court of the Western District of Texas and the District of Massachusetts, to decide the merits of the dispute involving the duration of the depositions of the Dell Witnesses.

THE SPECIAL MASTER'S REPORT WILL BECOME FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT, UNLESS OBJECTION IS TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANTICIPATED ORDER BY THE COURT WHICH SHORTENS THE TIME WITHIN WHICH AN APPLICATION MAY BE FILED PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53(f)(2).

ENTERED this day of December, 2008.

Vincent J. Poppiti (DSBA) No. 100614 Special Master